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Abstract
In humans, cultural evolutionary processes are capable of shaping our cognition, because the
conceptual tools we learn from others enable mental feats which otherwise would be beyond
our capabilities. This is possible because human culture supports the intergenerational accumula-
tion of skills and knowledge, such that later generations can benefit from the experience and
exploration efforts of their predecessors. However, it remains unclear how exactly human social
transmission supports the accumulation of advantageous traits, and why we see little evidence
of this in the natural behavior of other species. Thus, it is difficult to know whether the cogni-
tive abilities of other animals might be similarly scaffolded by processes of cultural evolution.
In this article, I discuss how experimental studies of cultural evolution have contributed to our
understanding of human cumulative culture, as well as some of the limitations of these
approaches. I also discuss how similar research designs can be used to evaluate the potential for
cumulative culture in other species. Such research may be able to clarify what distinguishes
human cumulative culture from related phenomena in nonhumans, shedding light on the issue of
whether other species also have the potential to develop cognitive capacities that are outcomes
of cultural evolution.
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1. Introduction
1.1. The cultural evolution of cognition: A uniquely human phenomenon?
In considering the role of cultural evolution in shaping cognition, it is important to
consider the scope and constraints of any such effects, including whether these are
restricted to humans alone. There are now many widely accepted examples of cultural
transmission in nonhumans, so does it follow that some of the cognitive capacities of
these animals might also be influenced in nontrivial ways by cultural inputs? Or is human
cultural evolution fundamentally different, and potentially capable of supporting the trans-
mission of cognitive tools in ways that nonhuman cultural evolution simply cannot? In
the current article, I examine how key features of human cultural evolution can be cap-
tured in experimental research designs, and I describe how such experimental methods
can be used to shed light on what might distinguish human cultural evolution from simi-
lar phenomena in nonhumans.
It is now relatively uncontroversial to claim that at least some aspects of the cogni-
tion of modern humans are largely a consequence of cultural evolution, built up over
generations of social transmission, rather than biological predispositions shaped primar-
ily by genetic control. Admittedly, there are some striking differences in opinion
regarding the range of attributes to which this might apply. For example, some con-
troversy remains over the extent to which cultural evolution might account for human
capacities for theory of mind (e.g., compare Heyes & Frith’s, 2014, cultural evolution-
ary account, with claims of false belief attribution in infancy, for example, Onishi &
Baillargeon, 2005). But for other examples, such as number systems and notations,
algorithms for calculation, or graphical codes for record-keeping of any kind, few
would question the importance of cultural evolution as an explanation for the use of
such conceptual tools. There is historical evidence documenting the development of
these techniques over many generations (Grattan-Guinness, 1997), they show cultural
variability (e.g., Bender & Beller, 2014), and mastery of the skills typically requires
conscious effort on the part of the learner (and indeed these may need to be explicitly
taught).
However, if some of our human cognitive abilities are not a direct outcome of spe-
cialized human biology, but are instead learned (e.g., Heyes, 2018a), then this poses
the important question of whether such abilities may, therefore, be possible in other
species. We are by no means the only species that exhibits cultural traditions (e.g.,
Whiten et al., 1999), so does this learning build and bolster cognitive capabilities in
these animals too, as well as influencing their (more readily observable) behavioral
traits?
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1.2. Human cultural evolution in comparative perspective
The answer to the above question depends on how similar human cultural evolution is
to related processes observed in other species. However, questions remain over the pre-
cise nature of the differences between human cultural evolution and cultural transmission
in other species, as well as the degree of similarity (e.g., Dean, Vale, Laland, Flynn, &
Kendal, 2014). Experimental research designs are likely to prove critical in resolving
these issues. Although naturalistic observations of both human and nonhuman cultural tra-
ditions can be extremely enlightening, experimental research offers important advantages.
First, in humans, such designs make it possible to manipulate the conditions under which
learning can occur, permitting conclusions about prerequisites and constraints associated
with particular population-level outcomes. Second, in nonhumans, it is possible to
actively probe the limits of a species’ capabilities, the extent of which may not be appar-
ent from the available naturalistic evidence. In the following sections, I consider the
existing and potential contributions of both of these experimental approaches, with regard
to similarities and differences between human and nonhuman cultural processes.
2. Laboratory studies of cultural evolution in human participants
2.1. Operationalizing human cultural evolution in experimental research designs
2.1.1. Capturing significant aspects of cultural evolutionary change
As noted above, experimental research offers potential for manipulation of variables of
interest in order to determine critical prerequisites for particular human cultural processes.
This is a key step in understanding whether certain cultural processes might also be present
in other animals, since it is possible to establish whether the effects are underpinned by
mechanisms that are unique to humans (e.g., language) or shared with other species. How-
ever, to do this one must first address the issue of precisely which features of human culture
we wish to capture experimentally, and how to go about operationalizing these features for
measurement. The phenomenon of cumulative culture, or cumulative cultural evolution, has
frequently been cited as exemplifying what is particularly special about human culture
(Boyd & Richerson, 1996; Heyes, 2012; Hill, Barton, & Hurtado, 2009; Laland & Hoppitt,
2003; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2009). This is partly because it is believed to be either
absent or extraordinarily rare in the natural behavior of nonhumans. However, it is primarily
due to the number of other peculiarly human traits it appears to support (e.g., Tomasello,
1999). This latter point is of course particularly relevant from the perspective of the issue at
hand, that is, the potential for shaping of cognitive abilities.
Cumulative cultural evolution can be conceived as a distinct subcategory of cultural
evolution, distinguished by its creation of traits in later generations that would also have
been preferred by members of earlier generations. In operationalizing this phenomenon
for experimental research, we are, therefore, looking for cases where the traits expressed
in later generations are demonstrably more effective or appealing in ways that are not
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purely dependent on current conditions. This criterion helps to distinguish cumulative cul-
ture from otherwise potentially confusable cases in which cultural evolution generates
change that is cumulative only in the general sense of being incremental and historically
dependent, but without producing traits that are increasingly advantageous. Tomasello
(1990, 1999) famously applied the analogy of the ratchet to human culture as a means to
capture this same notion, describing human cumulative culture as exhibiting a “ratchet
effect.” This apt analogy highlighted this particularly interesting and powerful property of
cultural evolution, differentiating it from change that is more arbitrary and/or cyclical.
It should be noted that the notion of contextually independent trait value may be con-
siderably more problematic for some behaviors compared with others. Communicative
signals, for example, are only effective if they can be interpreted by receivers. The effec-
tiveness of signal form is, therefore, necessarily tied to context. As such, the specifics of
communicative conventions are likely to be subject to change that is less ratchet like.
Nonetheless, increases in expressive power, independent of the nature of the signals used
(e.g., allowing for communication of novel concepts, or more efficient communication of
existing ones), remains understandable as cumulative in the sense of the cultural ratchet.
Therefore, in attempting to capture the phenomenon of cumulative culture under labora-
tory conditions, a key feature which needs to be reflected is the potential to deliver tangible
benefits to learners in later generations. Other features of cumulative culture which have
been identified in the existing literature have tended to arise from descriptions of exemplar
cases, rather than specifications of minimal defining criteria. But if our motivating interests
are, first, identifying significant critical preconditions, and second, establishing the extent of
similar effects in other species, then it is important to focus on features we consider to be
core constructs, as opposed to attempting to simulate phenomena which correspond closely
to portrayals of the most striking examples of human cumulative culture.
To illustrate this point, consider the nature of the changes proposed to arise from
cumulative culture. In some of the literature, cumulative culture has been characterized as
being best illustrated by increases in the complexity of cultural traits (Dean et al., 2014),
with increases in efficiency sometimes being cited alongside, as another possible outcome
that is somehow inferior or less interesting (see Section V.(2) in Dean et al., 2014). In
contrast, other authors have emphasized the advantages associated with increasing effi-
ciency and compressibility, with outcomes relating to complexity proposed to be less pre-
dictable (Kirby, Tamariz, Cornish, & Smith, 2015).
However, conceptualizing cumulative culture more broadly as allowing the develop-
ment of increasingly preferred traits over learner generations helps to clarify the apparent
dissent over the expected outcomes of cumulative culture. In some instances, increased
complexity is associated with increased functionality (e.g., modular technological innova-
tions), whereas in others (such as refinements of existing technologies) efficiency is desir-
able. Therefore, although cumulative culture often can be associated with increasing
complexity, this will not necessarily be the case. Likewise, it can be associated with
increasing efficiency, but this is also by no means guaranteed. Indeed, other benefits may
be associated with cumulative cultural traits which are not easily captured as either com-
plexities or efficiencies. For example, Schofield, McGrew, Takahashi, and Hirata (2017)
4 C. A. Caldwell / Topics in Cognitive Science (2018)
proposed adding “security” and “convenience” to this list, along with complexity and effi-
ciency. Talking of “preferred” traits may seem altogether more vague and difficult to
evaluate objectively, but it does at least allow us to capture what it is about cumulative
culture that we believe to be so valuable and compelling, that is, its capacity to deliver
advantageous traits, without placing restrictions on the nature of those advantages (they
would not, for example, need to be associated with demonstrable fitness benefits). This
inclusive concept of preference also effectively encompasses many noteworthy aspects of
human culture, which most would agree is broad in scope, extending over a range of
diverse domains including useful technologies, highly organized rule-governed societies,
and suites of technical knowledge and skills that permit survival in otherwise inhospitable
natural habitats.
In practice, it might turn out to be difficult to distinguish traits that would be preferred
over their precursors in an absolute sense, from those which are favored only due to cur-
rent environmental conditions. Nonetheless, regardless of the difficulties of evaluating
particular real-world cultural traits according to this criterion, it is relatively straightfor-
ward to implement within the context of experimental research with human participants,
since explicit task goals can be specified against which performance can be objectively
evaluated, making quantifiably better solutions easy to identify. For examples, see the
next section, describing studies using flight distances of paper planes and heights of spa-
ghetti towers (Caldwell & Millen, 2008), measures of similarity to a target goal state
(Muthukrishna, Shulman, Vasilescu, & Henrich, 2014), and load mass of baskets (Zwirner
& Thornton, 2015).
2.1.2. Capturing the trans-generational cumulative potential of social learning
Experimental designs aiming to capture cumulative culture must also effectively cap-
ture the trans-generational nature of the accumulated learning benefits. Simply demon-
strating that social information can be beneficial is not quite sufficient to conclude that
there is potential for cumulative culture. It is important to be able to show that the bene-
fits of social learning stack up over multiple generations of transmission.
Experimental designs intended to capture cumulative culture must, therefore, incorpo-
rate multiple learner generations. However, taking into consideration the ultimate goal of
drawing comparisons with nonhuman populations, we are once again faced with the ques-
tion of specifying minimum criteria. Assuming that the first learner generation of any
experimental design is comprised of individuals who approach a task or problem in the
absence of any social information (thus providing a baseline of the likely success of na€ıve
task exploration), over how many subsequent generations must any such measures of suc-
cess be seen to accumulate?
In order to conclude that the experimental results suggest potential for cumulative cul-
ture, transmission to only one generation of social learners (exposed to information from
the asocial learners’ baseline attempts) would seem insufficient. It is difficult to compare
the relative costs of learning from social demonstrations versus individual exploration,
and this limits what can be concluded from comparing performances of participants who
complete a task using individual exploration alone, with those of participants who have
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an opportunity to learn from such baseline exploration attempts before making their own.
In this scenario, even if the social learners performed better, it is not necessarily possible
to conclude that this could equate to a benefit to later learner generations in the real
world, since finding an appropriate source of social information, or the time consumed
observing them, could easily be at least as costly as simply expending additional individ-
ual exploration effort to reach an equivalent level of performance. However, if it is possi-
ble to show that comparable social learning opportunities are more valuable in later
generations, then it is much more reasonable to conclude that later generation learners are
liable to be in a more advantageous position regarding benefits of social information,
compared with their predecessors. So, for example, if a further sample of participants
were given the opportunity to learn from individuals who had observed the attempts of
the asocial learners, and if this second generation of social learners outperformed their
socially learning predecessors, then it is possible to conclude that the social information
itself was increasingly valuable.
If this is the case, then we can make the argument that benefits can, in principle,
accrue with repeated transmission. Such a demonstration, therefore, identifies the potential
for cumulative culture, regardless of whether it results in an outcome that is identifiably
beyond what a single individual could achieve in principle by themselves. Thus, although
cumulative culture is sometimes described as resulting in “behaviours that no individual
could invent on their own” (Boyd & Richerson, 1996, p. 770), as Tennie, Caldwell, and
Dean (2018) have previously argued, this should not be used as a criterion for guiding
classification of ambiguous cases, as it will tend to rule out examples which represent
incipient cumulative culture. Also, and more pragmatically, from the perspective of
experimental research design, feasibility issues dictate that measured behaviors must be
relatively achievable within a contracted timeframe. Thus, it may be more helpful to
think of the core defining feature of cumulative culture in terms of the potential for
increasingly valuable shortcuts to learning available to social learners over generations of
transmission.
The studies reported in Caldwell and Millen (2008) provide examples of how benefits
of experience can be shown to accumulate over learner generations in an experimental
context. Successive learner “generations” of participants (who could observe and interact
with their immediate predecessors) were each required to complete the same task, all
scored according to a prespecified goal measure. All participants were given the same
time limit in which to complete the task, as well as the same materials. Furthermore, they
each had the same amount of time available for observing their predecessors. The time
periods were short (5 min of observation time, followed by 5 min of building time) so
the tasks were necessarily relatively simple. In one experiment, participants were required
to build a paper plane (the goal measure being flight distance), and in another, the task
was to build a tower from raw spaghetti and modeling clay (the goal measure being
tower height). In both cases, participants in later generations scored higher in relation to
these goal measures compared with those in earlier generations. Therefore, these partici-
pants were able to achieve better outcomes in an equivalent time period, including the
time available for observational learning. Presumably, the performances to which they
6 C. A. Caldwell / Topics in Cognitive Science (2018)
were exposed were valuable sources of information about how to maximize their own
performance, and importantly, more so than the performances of members of earlier gen-
erations would have been.
Similar research designs have since been used by other authors to demonstrate similar
effects of accumulating benefits of otherwise equivalent social learning opportunities. For
example, Muthukrishna et al. (2014) asked participants to try to match a target image
using an unfamiliar image editing software package. In one of their experimental condi-
tions (see Experiment 1, five-model condition), they found that those in later generations
produced images that were quantifiably more similar to the target. Zwirner and Thornton
(2015) presented participants with a basket-making task, providing them with everyday
materials such as paper, string, and rubber bands, and a goal of producing a basket cap-
able of transporting rice. They found that participants in later generations were able to
perform better according to the goal measure of the mass of rice successfully transported.
In these studies, it has, therefore, been possible to show that the benefits of social
learning could accrue with repeated transmission, such that learning from individuals who
had themselves been exposed to social information was typically even more valuable than
learning from individuals who had engaged in na€ıve exploration. These laboratory models
capture this powerful property of human cultural transmission, which allows social learn-
ers to benefit not just from the experience of others, but the accumulated experience of
multiple others, even when opportunities for learning are otherwise held constant.
It should perhaps be noted at this point that the benefits of experience can accumulate
over multiple generations even when the “social” information is experienced in a decid-
edly nonsocial context. Muthukrishna et al. (2014) passed information between partici-
pants in the form of written instructions, so the individuals in question never actually
encountered one another directly. In Zwirner and Thornton’s (2015) study, learning from
others’ completed attempts was found to be sufficient to generate improvements in perfor-
mance. This was also the case in the follow-up to Caldwell and Millen’s (2008) study
(Caldwell & Millen, 2009), described in the next section. Thus, it remains an empirical
question whether or not the “social” aspect of some forms of social learning actively
facilitates learning, and this does not necessarily have any bearing on the potential for the
accumulation of benefits of experience.
2.2. Value and limitations of experimental research design for understanding
prerequisites of cumulative culture
One of the benefits of developing laboratory models, such as those described, is that
this allows manipulation of particular variables of interest, to compare group-level out-
comes when members complete the tasks under different conditions. From the perspective
of understanding the potential scope of cumulative culture, including the extent to which
such effects are likely to be possible in other species, a key question concerns the cogni-
tive and behavioral prerequisites of this phenomenon. This question can, therefore, be
addressed experimentally, through manipulation of the availability of sources of informa-
tion, or constraints placed on participants’ strategies or resources.
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However, it should be emphasized that results from any such simplified laboratory sim-
ulation must be treated with due caution. Most readers of this article will likely be famil-
iar with the aphorism that “all models are wrong but some are useful,” attributed to
Box (e.g., 1979), so I will not waste time elaborating on its meaning here. The important
point from the perspective of the current article is that the same could equally well be
said of cultural evolution experiments. While all experimental research necessitates sim-
plification of the noise and complications of real-world phenomena, with consequent
impact on external validity, cultural evolution experiments arguably represent a particu-
larly extreme case. To preserve their usefulness, we must be mindful of the simplifica-
tions imposed.
The need to control factors such as population size and structure render contexts inevi-
tably unrealistic, but the most serious threats to generalizability arise from the necessary
differences in scale between experimental and real-world contexts. This applies most
obviously to the timescales involved, with individual participants’ involvement in labora-
tory experiments typically lasting under an hour. In contrast, the behaviors that these
studies are intended to help explain are generally thought to have developed over multiple
human lifespans. This scaling down of timeframes places inherent constraints on the tasks
that can be presented, with these correspondingly scaled down in their complexity due to
the time available for completion. The reliance on simple tasks presents an obvious limi-
tation in that it could be argued that findings from cultural evolution experiments might
not extend to any behavior believed to depend on cumulative culture in the real world. In
studies investigating the conditions necessary for cumulative culture in humans, these
inevitable simplifications impose significant limitations on the types of conclusions that
can be drawn, and the nature of the evidence that would be required to draw conclusions
of any kind.
So, for example, it is important to note that failure to find an effect of cumulative
improvement over multiple learner generations within laboratory transmission chains is
not necessarily an indication that some missing element is, therefore, a prerequisite for
cumulative culture, since there are likely to be a multitude of alternative reasons why an
effect might not have been found. In contrast, finding a positive effect of improved per-
formance over multiple generations of social transmission is more informative. This can
allow a researcher to establish that some variable of interest which has been excluded is
not a strict prerequisite for cumulative culture. However, the important caveat arising
from the necessary simplifications and reductions of scale is that this might well be con-
text dependent. The excluded variable of interest may, therefore, turn out to be necessary
for cumulative improvements to be observed in other tasks, or within different population
structures.
A further type of result might involve multiple experimental conditions across which a
variable of interest had been manipulated. Finding a positive effect of cumulative
improvement in one condition, and a significantly reduced effect in at least one other,
allows a researcher to conclude that this manipulated variable may be important for
cumulative culture. The caveat once again, however, is that this is likely to be context
specific. As a consequence, any individual experiment can only ever contribute a small
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part of the explanation of how human minds generate cumulative culture, and why those
of other species appear not to. Ultimately, this question must be approached from a vari-
ety of different angles in order to form a more complete picture.
It is perhaps helpful to illustrate these points about what can and cannot be concluded
from such experimental research designs by considering Caldwell and Millen’s (2009)
study, which was the follow-up to the Caldwell and Millen (2008) publication described
earlier. Caldwell and Millen (2009) used the paper aeroplane task paradigm established in
the earlier (2008) publication in order to compare conditions in which participants had
access to different sources of social information (through observation of others’ task com-
pletion, inspection of their completed artifacts, and opportunities for exchanging informa-
tion through spoken communication). The results indicated that cumulative improvement
was possible on the basis of any of these sources of information. From a theoretical per-
spective, the most interesting conclusion was that cumulative culture appeared to be pos-
sible even in the absence of opportunities for imitation or teaching. In line with the
caveats noted above, the conclusion that these are not strict prerequisites can be justified,
whereas a blanket claim that they are unimportant, or unnecessary in any context, cannot.
2.3. Investigating task-specific effects in human cultural evolution
Even though conclusions about the prerequisites for cumulative culture will be deter-
mined in part by the properties of the task in question, this should not be regarded as
condemnatory for cultural evolution experiments. Far from closing doors, this perspective
illuminates previously underexplored avenues of investigation, which offer potentially
rich insights to a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the distinctiveness
of human culture. Indeed, this is particularly advantageous from the perspective of estab-
lishing the potential scope of cumulative cultural effects under different conditions,
including whether this might extend to more abstract contexts such as cognitive skills.
Turning the inevitable reality of task-specific effects into an advantage, rather than a
limitation, simply entails direct manipulation of task variables themselves, to investigate
how these affect transmission requirements. For example, Caldwell, Renner, and Atkinson
(2017) investigated the transmission of knot-tying skills for knots of differing complexity.
Participants had access to either finished products alone, or had additional pictorial
instructions about the process of completion, or were also paired with another participant
who had mastered the skill and could, therefore, engage in active demonstration and
interactive instruction and feedback. While all transmission conditions were equally effec-
tive for the knots classified as simple, the interactive teaching condition was much more
effective for those knots classified as complex.
It should be emphasized that this particular example was not a study illustrating cul-
tural evolution, since it considered only transmission to a single generation of learners.
Furthermore, since it concerned retention of an experimentally introduced complex skill,
only loss can be measured, and therefore there is no way to assess the kind of improve-
ments in performance that would be indicative of potential for cumulative culture. Natu-
rally, such approaches are likely to generate very different conclusions about
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prerequisites for effective transmission, with studies of loss possibly identifying mecha-
nisms supporting high-fidelity copying as more important than they would be for cumula-
tive improvement, and likely also underestimating the importance of mechanisms
generating effective novel inventions and modifications. Nonetheless, the logic behind the
experimental design in Caldwell et al.’s (2017) study can also be applied to cultural evo-
lution experiments, in order to investigate the differing requirements for cumulative
improvement within different behavioral contexts.
3. Laboratory studies of cultural evolution in nonhuman participants
Of course, studying only humans can only provide one part of the picture of the poten-
tial scope of cumulative culture. If a key question of interest concerns the extent of such
effects in other species, then studies of nonhuman animals also provide a critical source of
evidence. Although cumulative culture is widely believed to be either very rare or com-
pletely absent in the natural behavior of other species (as noted previously), it stands to
reason that it should be possible to document some degree of continuity between ourselves
and our closest evolutionary relatives, regarding the tendencies and capacities that support
such effects, even if the phenomenon itself does not manifest in quite the same form.
Even within the spontaneously occurring behavior of wild populations, there are puta-
tive examples of cumulative culture from nonhumans. For example, see Schofield et al.’s
(2017) analysis of historical data on Japanese macaque foraging techniques, and Sanz,
Call, and Morgan’s (2009) report of chimpanzees’ tool modification. However, these
examples remain controversial due to the difficulty of ruling out potential alternative
interpretations (such as modifications reflecting asocially learned refinements introduced
as a consequence of individuals’ increasing personal experience of the particular foraging
technique or tool, shaped by environmental feedback alone).
Experimental methods make it possible to systematically investigate the capabilities of
other species, using designs specifically devised to elicit key evidence, allowing clearer
conclusions regarding whether criteria for cumulative culture have been fulfilled. In addi-
tion, from the perspective of the question in hand (i.e., that of the potential scope of
cumulative culture in nonhumans, in terms of the traits it might support), experimentation
can also establish the kinds of skills that could in principle be supported by cumulative
culture in a given species.
In terms of the details of the designs which can be used to establish the potential for
cumulative culture in nonhumans, the same principles of design apply as already dis-
cussed for humans. If we are primarily interested in the accumulation of benefits of col-
lective experience, then once again we should be looking for evidence of objective
benefit to later generations, and social information becoming increasingly valuable.
In fact, currently there are very few studies with nonhumans that follow the principles
of design set out in Section 2, although I will describe one which does. However, before
doing so, it is important to note that even when using experimental designs which are in
principle capable of demonstrating the accumulation of benefits of experience, we must
10 C. A. Caldwell / Topics in Cognitive Science (2018)
still be wary of what we can, and cannot, conclude. The very same limitations that apply
to human cultural evolution experiments (described in Section 2.2) also apply to attempts
to use similar research designs with nonhumans.
So, once again there are limits on what we can conclude from a null result. If we find no
evidence of later generations of learners being able to benefit from the accumulated exper-
tise and exploration effort of their predecessors, this could occur for any one or more of a
number of reasons that may not preclude potential for cumulative culture in other contexts.
It might be that the performances that would be required for later generations to demonstrate
improvements upon those of their predecessors are simply beyond the capabilities of that
species. The individuals might never be able to learn the necessary behaviors under any cir-
cumstances. Alternatively, it could be the case that although the task can in principle be
mastered to the required degree, the opportunities afforded for learning from others in the
context of the research design are not adequate for expertise to be effectively transferred
(e.g., reliant on learners paying close attention to a relatively brief performance by an expe-
rienced individual—who may be unfamiliar, uninteresting, or potentially antagonistic).
Therefore, just as a failure to identify trans-generational improvements in task perfor-
mance in humans does not allow us to draw firm conclusions about necessary precondi-
tions, similar failures in studies of nonhumans likewise do not allow us to make
sweeping generalizations about the potential for members of that species to accumulate
benefits of experience via social transmission. Also, and again corresponding to the limi-
tations identified in relation to studies of humans, even positive results must be treated
with due caution. Positive results, while demonstrating that cumulative improvements are
possible, should generally be assumed to be context specific, at least until shown to gen-
eralize across a range of varying contexts.
However, echoing the optimistic message in relation to studies involving human partic-
ipants, the fact that a positive result is likely to be dependent on the details of the task,
as well as other contextual aspects, should be viewed as an opportunity rather than a
threat. This is in fact particularly true for studies of nonhuman species, because this may
allow researchers to design experiments in which later learner generations can benefit
from the accumulated experience of their predecessors, through careful consideration of
the propensities of the species in question.
Sasaki and Biro’s (2017) study of the efficiency of routes taken by homing pigeons repre-
sents an excellent example of such an approach. The researchers took into account the
birds’ tendency to fly alongside a partner, or as part of a flock, when released together. This
flocking naturally influenced choice of route, smoothing out idiosyncratic deviations. The
researchers reasoned that this process could result in the birds learning more efficient routes,
and that a replacement design involving multiple learner generations might, therefore, pro-
duce later generations who flew more efficient routes compared with earlier ones. Thus, the
researchers took advantage of the flocking tendency, which generated social heritability of
the trait in question (i.e., route choice). They also permitted the birds within any given gen-
eration (i.e., particular pairs) multiple flights together, so there were opportunities for each
pair to further refine route choice based on direct experience. Thus, across 10 chains, each
composed of five pigeons (each of which flew 12 times with their predecessor in the chain,
C. A. Caldwell / Topics in Cognitive Science (2018) 11
then 12 times with their successor), routes flown by pairs in the final generations were more
efficient than routes flown by pairs in earlier generations.
This result certainly fulfils the criterion of demonstrating tangible benefit to individuals
in later generations as a consequence of the accumulated experience of members of ear-
lier generations. It is reasonable to assume that the “goal” of the homing pigeons is to
complete their journey as quickly and efficiently as possible, so it follows that the birds
from earlier generations would—in principle—also have preferred the shorter, faster
routes of their successors. In studies of nonhumans, establishing the unambiguous superi-
ority of certain traits over others is likely to pose particular challenges. As previously
noted in relation to experiments involving human participants, the ability to present an
explicit task with clearly defined goal measures (e.g., tower height, maximum load mass,
or similarity to a target) renders this requirement fairly trivial. But it is of course impossi-
ble to simply induce task-appropriate motivations in nonhumans in quite the same way.
Thus, researchers must rely upon their subjects’ preexisting natural motivations. In some
cases (such as Sasaki & Biro’s study) it may be possible to design an experimental para-
digm which embeds this motivation within its original functional context. However, task
motivation is more likely to be induced through pretraining, as a means to ensure that
subjects associate aspects of experimental task performance with primary reinforcers
(such as food) of varying quantity or quality.
A further important detail about Sasaki and Biro’s study is that the birds had equiva-
lent opportunities for direct personal experience of flying the routes (i.e., same number of
flights completed, in the respective roles as the experienced, and inexperienced, member
of a pair). This means that it was possible to compare like with like, in considering the
performances of birds from different generations. Thus, we can also be confident that the
later generation birds are able to profit from accumulated expertise and exploration effort
even in the context of learning opportunities that were otherwise matched to those of
their predecessors. The later generation birds performed better because the social informa-
tion to which they were exposed was apparently more valuable.
It is important to note, however, that simplified task designs might demonstrate effects
which in practice do not have that effect in real-world populations. In real human cul-
tures, we know that later generations (this time also in the “real” sense of population
turnover) genuinely learn from, and build on, the accumulated expertise of their predeces-
sors, with systems and technologies being continually refined over many lifetimes. And
as such, we do routinely make use of techniques and inventions that were unavailable to
our ancestors. So in that respect we know that cumulative culture is a real phenomenon
in human societies. In contrast, it remains to be seen whether the effects identified in
Sasaki and Biro’s research, for example, illustrate effects which would actually bring tan-
gible benefits to later (real) generations of birds, compared with their predecessors. So,
do migrating species develop increasingly efficient routes over many years, in spite of
complete population turnover? Do contemporary populations of migrating birds use routes
which would have been used by their conspecific counterparts in decades gone by, had
they only had exposure to these possibilities? Sasaki and Biro’s (2017) findings cannot
answer these questions, but they do hint at their plausibility.
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Regardless of whether this effect reflects any real-world intergenerational learning
effects or not, it is likely that many readers will in any case find Sasaki and Biro’s claims
of cumulative culture questionable. The route efficiencies of homing pigeons may not
represent an example of cumulative culture as most would ordinarily conceive of it. Such
concerns are valid and should not be dismissed. In fact, such observations are essential
for understanding how we can evaluate the extent to which nonhuman capacities for
cumulative culture approach our own.
This is because task simplification, and careful tailoring of research designs to the
competencies of the species in question, may well be our most effective means of
approaching the question of how close other animals can come to human-like culture. As
noted previously, drawing informative conclusions depends on being able to identify posi-
tive effects, whether this might be a standalone positive result, or a result that demon-
strates a significant difference between a positive effect of cumulative performance in
one condition, and a reduced effect in another. However, subscribing to this view, that
positive effects are far more informative than null results, could potentially result in aban-
donment of studies of nonhumans as an exercise in futility. If ultimately our endeavor is
to evaluate claims about cumulative culture being a uniquely human trait (especially if
we regard those claims to be well-founded), then we might conclude that there is little to
be gained from nonhuman experimental research if its success depends on finding posi-
tive effects.
However, this is precisely the reason why the likely existence (and indeed virtual
inevitability) of task-specific effects should be viewed not as a threat to the validity of
our research conclusions, but rather as the key to progress in this field. Simplified task
designs, which nonetheless preserve the integrity of the fundamental value of cumulative
culture, may be our only means of escape from this logical quandary of identifying posi-
tive evidence of a property which so far has only been identified in human cultural tradi-
tions. And regardless of the specifics of the task in question, if it is possible to
demonstrate that learners are able to benefit from limited exposure to others’ performance
such that they can take advantage of the accumulated expertise of multiple learner gener-
ations, then we have captured an unarguably powerful property of social learning.
Such research designs can also then provide a starting point for identifying the con-
straints on cumulative culture-like effects in other species. Therefore, somewhat similar
to the approach taken in the study of teaching of knot-tying described previously (Sec-
tion 2.3), critical task variables can be manipulated according to researchers’ expectations
about the conditions under which a cumulative culture-like effect may be possible in their
study species. Researchers may, therefore, be able to identify limiting factors which
restrict the extent to which we see such effects occurring in natural behaviors.
4. Cumulative culture and the cultural evolution of cognition
Returning to the focus of this special issue, we must also consider the implications of
the arguments presented here for our understanding of the cultural evolution of cognition,
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specifically. Following on from the point above, suggesting that it might be possible to
document cumulative cultural phenomena in other species, if in very restricted set con-
texts, I would be inclined to speculate that such contexts are unlikely to extend to the
kinds of conceptual tools that actively facilitate and shape thinking.
Cumulative culture is necessarily dependent on agents being influenced by social infor-
mation in how they approach their goals. In humans, this can occur across a wide variety
of contexts, due to an explicit recognition of the potential value of social information
(which Heyes might describe as explicitly metacognitive social learning, for example,
Heyes, 2016). In contrast, it is reasonable to assume that nonhuman animals lack such
explicit understanding, given the contentiousness of claims of metacognitive awareness in
nonhumans, even as these relate only to the individual’s own knowledge state, (Hampton,
2009). Therefore, it is likely that there are major constraints on the contexts within which
nonhumans attend and respond to social information. This is probably restricted to two
broad categories of circumstance. The animal could either possess a specialized mecha-
nism that generates behavioral heritability, shaped by natural section (similar to the flock-
ing tendency underpinning Sasaki & Biro, 2017, findings). Alternatively, the animal’s
own experience could have resulted in the formation of associations such that conspecific
behavior becomes a cue indicating that certain behavioral responses are likely to have
positive consequences.
In either such circumstance however, although faithful social transmission can occur, it
is likely to do so only in very restricted contexts. In the case of naturally selected tenden-
cies, these will likely only operate within the particular domain which created the selec-
tive pressure for those mechanisms to exist (e.g., route choice for the pigeons). To
illustrate this point, consider the fact that although it might be possible to train pigeons to
have a “conversation” (Epstein, Lanza & Skinner, 1980), we would not expect na€ıve
untrained pigeons to be able to spontaneously take over one of the roles in this perfor-
mance, on the basis of simply observing their trained counterparts’ interaction. Although
high-fidelity transmission may be possible for route choices, it is not likely to operate in
this novel context.
Associative learning mechanisms provide another possible source of transmission fide-
lity which may have the power to support cumulative culture-like effects in nonhumans.
Through experience, animals may learn to use cues from conspecifics as predictors of
likely reinforcement (e.g., Leadbeater & Chittka, 2009). However, although an associa-
tively learned tendency to copy could have the potential to generalize to a degree that
permitted reproduction of novel variants (e.g., Custance, Whiten, & Bard, 1995), which
would be necessary for cumulative enhancements to accrue at all, this would also be unli-
kely to extend much beyond the domain within which it was originally learned.
If it is true that cumulative culture-like effects in nonhumans are restricted to cases
implicating one or other (or possibly some combination) of these two routes to transmis-
sion fidelity, we are unlikely to observe these supporting the development of cognitive
skill. This would require extending the reach of social learning mechanisms, developed or
selected for within particular behavioral domains, into a completely novel domain involv-
ing abstract rules with opaque benefits and functions.
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In contrast, if cumulative culture in humans relies heavily on explicitly metacognitive
social learning (Heyes, 2018b), with learners actively seeking out relevant information
based on their inferences and assumptions about others’ knowledge, this considerably
broadens out the behavioral contexts for which increases in functionality could be
observed over generations of social transmission, potentially opening up the possibility of
the cultural evolution of more abstract cognitive functions.
5. Conclusions
In conclusion, experimental approaches can, therefore, contribute a great deal to
understanding the potential scope of cumulative culture, including the extent to which
such effects might also occur in other species. The potential for manipulation of vari-
ables of interest is key to the value of experimental research, and I have argued that
in the context of cultural evolution experiments, two approaches in particular are use-
ful from the perspective of understanding the scope of, and limits on, cumulative cul-
ture. The first of these approaches, now well represented in the existing literature,
involves manipulation of the conditions under which participants complete a particular
task. This allows researchers to determine (within the context of that task) the con-
straints on, and prerequisites for, effective cumulative improvement over learner gener-
ations. This helps to identify key requirements for cumulative culture in studies
involving samples with recognized capacities for cumulative culture (i.e., adult
humans).
The second approach, which has yet to be exploited to its full potential, involves
manipulation of task features themselves. This would allow researchers to identify
whether there are circumstances under which cumulative improvement is theoretically
possible in studies involving samples (such as nonhuman species) for which cumulative
culture has not been convincingly documented in natural populations. This helps to pin
down the limiting factors that prevent such cumulative improvements from being
observed in practice under more realistic conditions, or in different contexts or
domains.
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